Les Déchets Post-Catastrophe
(Post Catastrophic Waste)
DEAD: 13,232
MISSING: 14,544[1]
The March
11, 2011 earthquake and tsunami was catastrophic for Japan. Not only do the
residents of Fukushima, Iwate and Miyagi prefectures have to contend with the
fears of radioactive contamination, they have to bear the brunt of a massive
clean-up effort. Though related,
finding a proper method to dispose of disaster waste is entirely different from
cooling the reactors at the Fukushima nuclear reactors and presents its own
host of problems. This report aims
to examine several aspects of the post-disaster waste left behind by the
destruction. First, we will start
with the estimated extent and cost of the clean up, including a breakdown of
each prefecture and the amount of damage in each respective area. In the second
and third parts, we will analyze the government’s response to the waste problem
and the obstacles they have encountered.
Fourthly, we will shortly discuss the spread of toxins and other
contaminants and other related areas. (This section is inevitably short, since
the collection of data is hampered both by a lack of access to affected areas
and by a slow government bureaucracy.)
I.
Measuring the Carnage
There
are rough estimates of the cost to infrastructure, but as more time passes, the
scale and cost of the damage has and will become clearer. According to the World Bank, the clean
up will cost around $235 billion, making it the world’s most expensive
disaster.[2]
A) Cost of the Damage and
Clean-up
In
the early stages of the crises, perhaps occupied by more immediate concerns or
perhaps hindered by communication obstacles, the government was prone to
wide-ranging cost estimates. The
first measurements began appearing two weeks after the initial March 11
earthquake. The federal government on March 23 said the amount “could be more
than double the cost of the Kobe earthquake,” ranging from ¥16 trillion ($198
billion) to ¥25 trillion ($310 billion.)
The World Bank (WB) estimated it at $122 to $235 billion.[3]
A March 24 New York Times article stresses that the extent of infrastructure
damage will remain unclear until further data is collected.[4] Civilians from universities and think
tanks were prohibited by transportation, as entry to the disaster areas was
initially restricted only to emergency vehicles, or by the debris itself.[5]
By
the following months, the figures became less shrouded in uncertainty but still
differed among multiple sources. In April, the WB had solidified its estimate
towards the higher extreme at $235 billion, with EU diplomats believing Japan
would be the largest aid recipient in the year 2011. On April 22nd the government passed a $48 billion
budget to deal with the crises, from which they earmarked 250 billion yen
($3.10 billion) just for clearing the debris itself. However, a June 23rd Wall Street Journal article
cites that the total, actual cost of the removal is projected to be more than
$8.4 billion.
B) Scale of the Disaster
Again,
the amount of damage done to Japan’s infrastructure and the length of the
subsequent cleanup period differs from source to source but there is relative
agreement among the key figures.
In the early stages, the amount of damage remaining on the ground and
the damage to working infrastructure was at its worst. The following is a
breakdown of the infrastructure status as of May 17th-May 24th,
six to thirteen days after the initial earthquake.[6] [7]
Power
·
Two
million households without power
·
Millions,
including parts of the capital, had been subject to rolling blackouts and
reduced train services
·
3%
of the power service essentially taken out of service permanently
·
Oil
and gas plants had been taken out of service for safety checks
Roads
·
Damage
to roads is localized, only 4% of Japan’s total geographic area
·
Damage
to air freight is minimal, only Sendai airport significantly damaged
Shipping
·
At
least 6 seaports have seen major damage
·
The
biggest port in the north-east Sendai has been destroyed and will not be
operational for months
·
The closure of ports was estimated to be
costing Japan $3.4 billion a day, in lost sea-borne trade each day
General
Infrastructure
·
Gas
& water distribution improved, but many towns remained with limited to no
service
·
Engineers
at University of Tokyo listed 17 bridges that had been washed away by the
tsunami, flooding at one damaged dam, and dozens of landslides and deposits of
debris that have closed roads. In one case, they reported tsunami damage along
an 18-mile stretch of coastal roads south of Iwaki.
·
50
sewage plants damaged, 5 sewage plants destroyed
A month later, the
Environment Ministry of Japan had solidified its estimates of the waste. For
example, by April, it estimated the tsunami had generated about 16 million tons
of waste in Miyagi Prefecture, 6 million tons in Iwate Prefecture and 2.9 million
tons in Fukushima Prefecture. This
includes at least 16 towns, 95,000 buildings, 23 railway stations and hundreds
of kilometers of roads, railway tracks and sea walls.[8] Japan’s National Police Agency says
18,000 houses collapsed and that about 140,000 others were partially damaged.
This adds to a total of around 25
million tons, a figure the mainstream media has generally agreed upon. But
because vehicles and ships are not included in these figures, the total
quantity is likely much higher. But
according to non-governmental sources, like Kazuyuki Akaishi of the Japan
Research Institute, the volume can range from 80 million tons to 200 million
tons.[9] National Public Radio cites him as
settling on “100 million tons.”[10]
Without counting vehicles and ships, the amount of waste in the March disaster
is 1.7 times that left by the 1995 quake.[11] According to Shinichi Sakai,
professor of environmental engineering at Kyoto University the waste is “about
half of what the Japanese households produce in waste annually.”[12]
Put in another way, the quantity of debris in the three prefectures is
equivalent to more than a decade's worth of the region's normal solid-waste
output. It dwarfs the amount of
debris—about 14.5 million tons—that had to be cleaned up after the Hanshin
quake, which hit the southern port city of Kobe in 1995. The New York Times
stated, “Wrecked houses and uprooted trees make up the majority of the waste.”[13] The key word there is majority; there
were and as of July 2011, there are large swaths of automobiles, ships, general
infrastructure rubble, electronics, and
C) Cleanup Projections
Estimates of how long the
clean up will take also differ from source to source. On March 24, the New York Times quoted Tokyo saying
reconstruction will take five years.
On May 11th, the guardian stated the government estimates it
will take three years to deal with the 25m tons of debris, which will have to
be scrapped, burnt or recycled.
This figure seems underestimated, since according to a June 23rd
Wall Street Journal article, simply collecting and then sorting the debris will
take two years.[14]
Furthermore, clean up of the 1995 earthquake took years and the amount of waste
in the 2011 quake is 1.7 times the former.[15]
II.
Clean up: Process and Problems
This
section covers the actual attempts to sort, separate and remove the rubble
itself. Progress was and is slow,
due to a number of factors listed in the follow sub-sections. According to
Environment Ministry estimates, as of May 17 the rubble that local governments
have been able to pick up, transport and set aside at dump locations amounts to
only a small portion of the total: 19 percent in Iwate, 14 percent in Miyagi
and 11 percent in Fukushima. More than 200 sites have been set aside for
dumping, but the ministry says many more are needed. By June 2nd, the New York
Times cites the Environment Ministry saying less than 20 percent of the debris
left by the disaster has been sorted and transported to collection sites. By June 15, the figure had barely moved
to over 5m tons – or 22% – having been removed. The slow pace of the clean up
is not entirely the government’s fault.
The nuclear meltdown at Fukushima clearly occupied official priority and
the majority of obstacles to the clean up are outside of human control. For example, severed communication
lines hampered discussion between local and federal government agencies and of
course, the damaged infrastructure itself prevented access to damaged areas.[16]
However, the government is clearly at fault in other areas, which we shall see
later.
Lack
of space
The
first and foremost problem is a clear lack of space to put the rubble. Though not officially cited by the
government, the media’s coverage of the rubble presents this as problem number
one. Even if rubble has been
collected, sorted and is ready for transport, there is not enough space in
collection areas, officials said.
"The volume is so great, it's difficult to know what to do with it
all," said Tadashi Umiyama, the head of Ofunato's construction department (of
Iwate Prefecture) and leader of its rubble-removal effort. "There's just
not enough room."[17]
In some collection centers, the debris has already reached heights of several
stories. But even if the waste is piled five meters high-about the maximum
possible to avoid spontaneous combustion-it could only store about 10 million
tons of waste. A symbolic example
is the town of Morioka (Iwate), who said they need about 740 acres for storage,
but so far they have found sites totaling only 320 acres.[18]
The problem with Iwate and Miyagi prefectures is that neither have very flat
topographies meaning, combined, they have a total of only 174 hectares (429.96
acres) to store debris temporarily.[19]
There have been accounts of schoolyards and sport centers being used as temporary
storage sites.[20] The Los
Angeles Times reported baseball fields and stadiums also being used.[21]
Residents
The clean-up process is being slowed to enable residents to
salvage as many of their belongings as possible. Home-owners have a choice to
deny permission for demolition. If they put a red flag outside their building,
wrecking crews are allowed to tear the structures down and leave any
possessions on the site. A yellow flag means the building should be left intact
and only the surrounding roads cleared. Logically, this means the razing
process cannot be done wholesale and must be done instead piece by piece.
Furthermore, as morbid as it sounds, the clean up is slowed by searches for the
dead. For example, the Ofunato
municipal government has left much debris largely untouched as it searches for
the about 200 residents who are still missing. "It'll take a while to
remove [the disaster waste] since we're doing it while we look for
bodies," said Mamoru Sato, director of the city's urban planning department.[22]
Lack
of resources
The
Waste Disposal Act dictates that “disaster-waste” is the responsibility of
municipal governments. However, the extent of the disaster is so large these
regional governments are finding themselves literally swamped by the debris. Moreover, these municipal governments
have in turn consigned the task to local companies of local governments. These local authorities do not have the
heavy-machinery necessary to move large amounts of waste and due to ordering
problems, have been unable to obtain more.[23]
In Kesennuma, Miyagi Prefecture, orders for debris removal are placed through
an association for disposing of disaster-related waste that comprises about 90
local companies, mainly engineering firms, in the city. The principle is to share work
contracts among local companies. The association aims to finish in 200 days,
meaning in December. The government of Kamaishi, Iwate Prefecture, has also
left all elements of removing debris to a branch of the prefecture's
association of construction companies, based on oral contracts. Work periods
and remuneration were not specified.
The government of Ishinomaki, Miyagi Prefecture, signed contracts with
individual construction companies, but a branch in the city of the prefectural
association assigns work areas to each company.[24]
Again, morbidly, municipal and local governments are facing human resource
shortages, as many civil servants perished in the earthquake/tsunami or have
gone to look for their families.
The majority of municipal governments have asked for outside help and
believe the clean up task can only be completed in a reasonable time if the
federal governments aids the process.
By April, the government said it would pay for the entire cleanup
operation but significant funds have yet to be distributed as of July
2011.
Legal
Barriers
The
above-mentioned Waste Disposal Act stipulates that municipal governments are
mandated to clean up post-disaster waste. It reads, “In this Law, ‘waste’ refers to refuse, bulky
refuse, ashes, sludge, excreta, waste oil, waste acid and alkali, carcasses and other filthy and unnecessary matter,
which are in solid or liquid state (excluding radioactive waste and waste polluted by radioactivity).” But, the Nuclear Reactor Regulation Law
defines radiation-contaminated waste as water or items tainted during incidents
inside a nuclear power plant facility; it does not cover radioactive substances
dispersed outside a nuclear facility due to an accident. This legal ambiguity has meant slow
progress in the disaster-affected areas, namely Fukushima. Moreover, the Waste
Disposal Act explicitly excludes “industrial waste,” which includes “all the
waste left as a result of business activity.”[25] In theory, this means waste
contaminated by damaged production or chemical plants will fall under the
jurisdiction of the federal government.
But due to the near impossible task of distinguishing contaminated waste
from “safe” waste, this section of the law has not been put into practice. The
federal government will eventually stipulate standards to dispose of
radioactive-contaminated waste (see
section III), but it is in this domain where Tokyo could have acted more
decisively.
Contamination
The
most significant obstacle to proper debris removal is contamination, the least
of which is from radioactivity. A
simple listing of the possible toxins would be insufficient to discuss how the
problem is intricately tied in with efforts to remove the rubble. It is necessary to first review
attempted solutions on the part of the government.
III.
Attempted Solutions and Subsequent Problems
It
is a horrid way to teach, but the 1995 Kobe gave Japan the experience to
respond to a similar disaster. In
some ways, the central government and its institutions seemed to have learned
some lessons. For example, Tokyo’s immediate response was much quicker than it
was over a decade ago.[26]
However, it is clear that the Kobe earthquake and the “Great East Earthquake”
of 2011 differ in many respects, most notably in the size of the disaster, the
subsequent size of the clean-up, and thus the proportional size of
contamination. The following
section will address the attempted solutions taken on part by the government to
solve the debris problem. In some
respects, neither Tokyo nor municipal or local governments have succeeded in
solving every problem listed in the above section. However, some progress has been made in certain areas, as we
shall see.
Recycling
Of the
assorted types of debris leftover from the disaster, the government aims to
recycle as much as possible. In
mid-May, the Environment Ministry published a guideline on the subject of. Of course, the first step in doing so
is to sort and separate the rubble.
The most basic divisions are among concrete, wood and steel; though within
this categorization there are sure to be further divisions. Furukawa Tatsuhiro,
a bridge engineer who had been assigned to a demolition operation said,
"Just clearing the debris will take a year or two, then sorting everything
will need several more years."
Metal, from wrecked automobiles, house parts or other refuse will be
sold for scrap metal. At Kamaishi, wrecked vehicles are moved to the police car
park, which has become a graveyard for more than 600 Nissans, Toyotas and
Hondas. Owners can claim their cars or condemn them as scrap. Wood will be burned to be used as
biomass fuel at biopower plants (see next section.) Other unusable debris will be collected and transported to
dump sites. To assist in
recycling, the Forestry Agency will subsidize 50 percent of the cost of
crushing machines that turn waste lumber and wood into chips, the only usable
form of wood the incinerators will accept. In Sendai, the capital of the hardest hit Miyagi, the agency
set a goal of putting 10 percent to 20 percent of the waste wood into
productive use. The recycling targets are low because most local governments in
the devastated areas do not have the manpower or resources to carry out the
full formula of collecting, sorting and recycling set out in guidelines drafted
by the Environment Ministry after the disaster. Sendai estimates that the heap of wood waste will add up to
230,000 to 250,000 tons. Some cities are depending on the electricity created
by biomass plants, to make up for the loss of power from the Fukushima Dai-ichi
plant.
Incineration
The
ash produced by the incineration will be used in the process of reconstruction,
namely making more concrete. The
Ofunato kiln in Iwate Prefecture is a prime example. In its first day of operation, it processed about 10 tons of
rubble. Engineers say it will
eventually be able to handle up to 300 tons per day. However, in an ironic twist, the earthquake and tsunami
damaged the plant, hindering its ability to run at full efficiency. Other kilns in Iwate, Miyagi and
Fukushima have had similar problems.
And incineration is not a silver bullet. Even if
the government can persuade every waste-disposal plant in the Iwate prefecture
to devote 20% of its capacity to rubble, it will take four years to get rid of
it all.[27] Furthermore, there is a risk of
contamination. Much of the wood
contains high quantities of salt, leftover from the tsunami. Not only will burning salty wood damage
incinerators, it will produce dangerous carcinogens, like dioxins and furans.[28]
The National Institute for Environmental Studies in Ibaraki Prefecture said
that exposing such wood debris to the elements, like rain, could wash out some
of the saline content. This
recommendation was officially endorsed by the government’s Guidelines for
Disaster Waste Management. Firstly, there will be little amounts of rain during
the summer months of 2011, when significant clean-up efforts have already been
started. Secondly, it is not clear
that the municipal/local authorities have the patience or manpower to follow
said guidelines.
Approval
to incinerate contaminated rubble
Faced
with legal ambiguities, general confusion about waste management, lack of
space, and hence growing mountains of flammable trash, the central government
was finally forced to find a temporary solution that would relieve at least
some of the pressure from the clean-up process. On June 19th, the Environment Ministry approved
the incineration and burial of radioactive waste, providing it falls under a
certain threshold. Though this
policy mainly concerns Fukushima, it very well applies to Iwate and Miyagi
prefectures since both have been discovered to contain contaminated waste.[29] In essence, the ministry has allowed
local governments to bury burned rubble containing less than 8,000 becquerels
of radioactive cesium per kilogram of rubble at waterproof final disposal sites
for ordinary waste. However, the ministry will ban such disposal sites from
being converted to residential areas in the future.[30] Officials said they settled on 8,000
becquerels because that amount is deemed safe to handle it directly. Ash and other rubble that contains
above the 8,000 level will be placed in special drums that can block radiation. What the government will do with those
drums has yet to be determined.
Authorities have been asked to store ash containing more than 100,000
becquerels in facilities shielded by concrete walls. Furthermore, the June 19th policy allows sludge,
concrete fragments and other non-burnable waste to be placed in final disposal
sites for ordinary waste. This
caveat is misleading, as it appears to imply that these other types of refuse
are considered as safe as normal trash.
However, they also contain radioactivity. For example, toxic sludge was first found in a sewage treatment
facility in Fukushima on May 1st and has since been found in other
prefectures as well. Lastly, the
June 19th guideline did not cover the debris and waste within the
evacuation zone around the Fukushima nuclear plant, which has remained
untouched.
IV.
Toxins and Contamination
So
far, we have discussed two possible types of contamination, radioactivity from
the Fukushima plant and the possibility of carcinogens from the burning of
salted wood. However there are other toxins that result from the infrastructure
damage brought on by both the earthquake and tsunami.
Asbestos
The most immediate concern is
asbestos. First off, the sheer
amount of possible asbestos in the damaged buildings will be much higher than
in other developed countries.
Japan had banned spry-on asbestos in 1975, but a broader law preventing
asbestos use outright was not passed until 2006.[31]
Japan's health ministry has distributed 90,000 dust prevention masks although
many workers do not wear them because they restrict breathing. It will soon
distribute 600 high-efficiency filter masks with electric fans to make
breathing easier.
Activists have found the
cancer-causing, fibrous material in the air and debris collected from the
devastated northeastern coast.
Asbestos was not an immediate concern after the tsunami, since
infrastruture remained wet. But now that the majority of rubble has dried and
clean up efforts will stir up laten debris, asbestos will be a growing
concern.
Other
Toxins
According
to Professor Atsushi Iizuka and other researchers at Kobe University, 2.2 times
the national standards of arsenic, fluorine and boron compounds were detected
along the coastal region of Miyagi Prefecture.[32] These came from facilities containing
said material, particularly petrochemical, chemical and industrial plants. Specifically, the researchers collected
soil samples from ten locations in Miyagi and measured them against the safety
standards stipulated in the Soil Contamination Countermeasures Law. Lead and lead compounds were also found
but their levels were well below national standards. There have been calls to measure the levels of toxins in
other areas, before all the contaminants dry and turn in powder, creating a
inhalation problem with the citizens.
[1] Matthew Bloch and al., “Map of the
Damage from the Japanese Earthquake,” Interactive (Northern Japan: New York
Times, 2011).
[2]
“After the
tsunami: Japan’s clear-up likely to take three years | World news | The
Guardian”, May 11, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/may/11/japanese-tsunami-survivors-search-for-mementos.
[3]
Takashi
Nakamichi and Tatsuo Ito, “Tokyo Estimates Disaster Costs of Almost $200
Billion,” wsj.com, March 24, 2011,
sec. Asian Business News,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704050204576217852022676740.html.
[4]
Henry
Fountain, “Extent of Infrastructure Damage in Japan Is Still Unclear,” The New York Times, March 24, 2011, sec.
World / Asia Pacific,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/25/world/asia/25infrastructure.html?_r=1&scp=25&sq=japan+debris&st=nyt.
[5]
Ibid. The National Science Foundation, which
finances field research after disasters and supported an engineering team that
went to New Zealand after the
recent earthquake there, said it was accepting proposals for Japan. The
review process takes several weeks.
[6]
“Crisis
damage to cut Japan growth,” BBC,
March 17, 2011, sec. Business, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-12756379.
[7]
Henry
Fountain, “Extent of Infrastructure Damage in Japan Is Still Unclear,” The New York Times, March 24, 2011, sec.
World / Asia Pacific,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/25/world/asia/25infrastructure.html?_r=1&scp=25&sq=japan+debris&st=nyt.
[8]
“After the
tsunami: Japan’s clear-up likely to take three years | World news | The
Guardian”, May 11, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/may/11/japanese-tsunami-survivors-search-for-mementos.
[9]
Julie
Makinen, “After Japan disaster, disposing of waste creates dilemmas,” Los Angeles Times, May 3, 2011,
http://www.latimes.com/news/science/la-fg-japan-trash-20110403,0,5626871.story?track=rss&utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+latimes%2Fnews%2Fscience+%28L.A.+Times+-+Science%29.
[10]
Yuki
Noguchi, “One Big Obstacle to Japan’s Recovery? Trash,” National Public Radio, April 29, 2011,
http://www.npr.org/2011/04/29/135770675/one-big-obstacle-to-japans-recovery-trash.
[12]
Miki
Tanikawa, “Finding Use for 25 Million Tons of Rubble,” The New York Times, June 2, 2011, sec. Business Day / Global
Business,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/03/business/global/03iht-RBOG-JAPAN-RUBBLE03.html.
[13]
Miki
Tanikawa, “Finding Use for 25 Million Tons of Rubble,” The New York Times, June 2, 2011, sec. Business Day / Global
Business,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/03/business/global/03iht-RBOG-JAPAN-RUBBLE03.html.
[14]
Gordon
Fairclough, “Debris Blocks Japan Recovery Aims,” wsj.com, June 23, 2011, sec. Japan News,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303499204576390191637374796.html.
[16] “Casting about for a future: The
Japanese economy is recovering faster than expected from disaster. Can broader
reform come quickly too?,” The Economist,
May 19, 2011, http://www.economist.com/node/18713566.
[17]
Gordon
Fairclough, “Debris Blocks Japan Recovery Aims,” wsj.com, June 23, 2011, sec. Japan News,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303499204576390191637374796.html.
[18]
Ibid.
[20]
“Mountains
of rubble remain a headache in Fukushima,” Asahi
News, June 25, 2011, http://www.asahi.com/english/TKY201106240210.html.
[21] Julie Makinen, “After Japan
disaster, disposing of waste creates dilemmas,” Los Angeles Times, May 3, 2011,
http://www.latimes.com/news/science/la-fg-japan-trash-20110403,0,5626871.story?track=rss&utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+latimes%2Fnews%2Fscience+%28L.A.+Times+-+Science%29.
[23]
“Japan:
Focus on local firms slows debris removal,” Asia
One News, May 16, 2011,
http://www.asiaone.com/News/Latest+News/Asia/Story/A1Story20110516-279054.html.
[24]
Ibid.
[26]
“Stoicism
amid the debris,” The Economist,
March 13, 2011, http://www.economist.com/blogs/banyan/2011/03/after_earthquake.
(Tokyo mobilized 100,000 troops to begin the search-and-rescue effort)
[27] Gordon Fairclough, “Debris Blocks Japan Recovery
Aims,” wsj.com, June 23, 2011, sec.
Japan News,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303499204576390191637374796.html.
[29]
“Radioactive Debris Dilemma
Unresolved, Growing Worse.” Japan Times
Online 1 July 2011. Web. 7 July 2011.
[30] “Environment Ministry to Approve Incineration of
Rubble Contaminated with Radiation.” Mainichi
Daily News 20 June 2011. Web. 27 June 2011.
[31] Tomoko Hosaka, “Asbestos, Japan
tsunami’s other hidden danger,” Associated
Press, April 27, 2011,
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20110427/ap_on_re_as/as_japan_earthquake_asbestos;_ylt=AjfPR2Si4CF1_wKO0J7rNwunxQ8F;_ylu=X3oDMTMzOHJmNTgxBGFzc2V0A2FwLzIwMTEwNDI3L2FzX2phcGFuX2VhcnRocXVha2VfYXNiZXN0b3MEcG9zAzIwBHNlYwN5bl9wYWdpbmF0ZV9zdW1tYXJ5X2xpc3QEc2xrA2FzYmVzdG9zamFwYQ--.
[32] “Double the standard of toxic
materials detected along coast of Miyagi Prefecture,” Mainichi Daily News, June 25, 2011, online edition edition,
http://mdn.mainichi.jp/mdnnews/news/20110602p2a00m0na016000c.html.
