Pitfalls and Perceptions: How Inequality Skews Public Health

Jonathan Senin
2.19.14

The only undeniable victory of the Occupy movement has been to shift national dialogue and focus onto inequality. Investigations into the structures supporting the growing divide between economic classes have since prompted calls for policy changes like the closure of tax havens, extension of unemployment benefits, and the introduction of incentives to “re-shore” manufacturing processes.

A natural accompaniment to the sober dialogue of policy is public anger and vitriol over the excesses of extreme wealth. Middle and lower class Americans are, understandably, fuming about inflated CEO pay and extravagant pleasure trips to central Europe. Yet, the national chatter obscures some of the darker sides of inequality. Specifically, there is a growing body of evidence that economic inequality, and our perception of it, adversely affects both our mental health and our perception of physical health.

It’s been established that populations on the lower end of the socioeconomic scale correlate with relatively worse health indicators: they die younger, get sick more often and pay more for treatment.  The American Journal of Public Health conducted a wide-ranging study using decades of US data: Paula Bravemen writes that those with “lowest income and who were least educated were consistently least healthy.”

The study utilized traditional metrics for health, which exclude the arguably subjective measurements for mental health.  Yet, recent evidenced published in 2012 documents “a wide range of mental disorders [that] might originate in a ‘dominance behavioral system.’”   Sheri Johnson, from UC Berkeley, discovered that people have very specific brain mechanisms designed to process and internalize social power and hierarchy.  These parts of the brain are almost “universal in mammals,” let alone humans.  Ms. Johnson concludes that mental conditions like mania and narcissism are associated with our attempts to gain status and dominance, while disorders like anxiety and depression are linked with feelings of subordination.  Furthermore, she suggests that the maddening pressures of coping with social stratification aggravate other conditions such as “antisocial personality disorder and bipolarism.”

One of the weird quirks of an inequitable society is that larger levels of inequality actually reinforce the existence of inequality itself.  Sociologists at the University of Toronto found that, “although there is always some connection between people’s income and the social class to which they feel they belong, the match between the two is closer in societies with bigger income differences between rich and poor.”   In other words, the more unequal a society, the more people associate their social class with their levels of income. The researchers propose that highly unequal societies intensify issues of dominance and subordination, and feelings of superiority and inferiority.

Inequality not only intensifies mental disorders, it also make them more pervasive. A new study by Dublin-based researchers of 34,000 people in 31 countries found that in nations with larger income differences, status anxiety was more common at all levels in the socioeconomic ladder.  A 2011 study discovered that “self-enhancement or self-aggrandizement… occurred much more frequently in more unequal societies.”

The findings are troubling, especially for developing countries.  As nations get richer, they usually go through a period of economic disparity, with income inequality almost an inevitable product of growth. Whether inequality has and will become a permanent fixture of emerging markets is a debatable future. But the development of negative mental conditions associated with economic inequality is all but certain. Resource-scarce governments and institutions must evolve to solve these new challenges.




So, it is clear that growing inequality makes us all more conscious about “image management” and “social perception,” which can affect our mental health.  Worse still, socioeconomic inequality changes our perception of physical health as well. Before the very public shouting matches over Obamacare made both healthcare access and income inequality hot button issues, most Americans were unaware of health disparities, “especially regarding health disparities among groups identified other than by race or ethnicity.”   Angela Rohan discovered that, even if Americans knew about health disparities, they varied widely as to its causes and solutions. More crucially, Lynch and Gollust find that, in America, equal access to health care is more important than equality in health outcomes.

In other words, societies that perceive themselves as “equal” are by and large ignorant of health disparities. Even if members of that society are aware of differences in the health of their more/less rich neighbors, equal opportunity is considered to be more important them than equal outcomes.  Members of perceived equitable societies rationalize health disparities by citing other health determinants, like age, race and genetic background, rather than economic inequality itself.  Whether these factors, or socioeconomic inequality, are more responsible for health disparities is still unclear.  But other research suggests that it doesn’t matter. Lewis, Saulnier and Renaud assert that “universal access has done little to change the way health status is distributed across population groups and that health promotion efforts have failed to alter the distribution of health status among group or classes”  More importantly, “They suggest that reducing health disparities may depend on political will which in turn is driven by political ideology and perceptions of health inequality.” Angela Rohan agrees: “Lay perceptions of health disparities can serve a valuable purpose in the development and implementation of policies aimed at improving health and reducing inequality.”  In other words, the political will necessary to address health disparities may require an admission that our society is unequal in the first place; societies that are premised upon equality, like the United States, may not admit such inequalities at all.

Thankfully, there is room for hope.  Providing there is political will, egalitarian policies directly lead to more equitable health outcomes. Vincente Navarro’s huge study of OECD countries over a 50-year period shows that “political parties with egalitarian ideologies tend to implement redistributive policies aimed at reducing social inequalities.”   It should be no surprise that Democrats have and will be in favor of universal health care. Navarro’s contribution was to show a historical, and almost universal, correlation between ideology and welfare policy.  




That inequality can adversely affect health is one of those intractable problems that development economists despise. While inequality can cause of bad health, health improvements are also crucial in reducing income inequality and in constructing a more equitable society, generally.

Developing-country governments are in a tough spot.  Strapped for resources, they often prioritize economic growth over public health. This is dangerous. Obviously, a sick public is not very productive, nor innovative; economic growth suffers in the face of declining public health. Secondly, institutions, both public and non-governmental, gain resources and prestige by promoting economic growth above other concerns.  Even when more resources become available, institutional momentum is so far “down the line” that it is difficult to redistribute funds to their most efficient destination.  In additional to organizational focus, public health is politically dangerous.  As China is learning, anger over health scares can spread quickly, creating politically toxic environments. Worse, health scares are geographically universal. While economic growth promotes one region of a country over another, health concerns can affect an entire nation.

But the most dangerous facet of inequality is public ignorance of health inequality itself. Only large amounts of political will motivate governments, and unwilling publics, to accept the fact that disparities do exist.  As developing governments learn about the value and use of political capital, hopefully they will learn about the value of spending it on the public’s health.  

References:

Braveman, Paula A., Catherine Cubbin, Susan Egerter, David R. Williams, and Elsie Pamuk. “Socioeconomic Disparities in Health in the United States: What the Patterns Tell Us.” American Journal of Public Health 100, no. S1 (April 2010): S186–S196. doi:10.2105/AJPH.2009.166082.
Dankwa-Mullan, Irene, Kyu B. Rhee, David M. Stoff, Jennifer Reineke Pohlhaus, Francisco S. Sy, Nathaniel Stinson, and John Ruffin. “Moving Toward Paradigm-Shifting Research in Health Disparities Through Translational, Transformational, and Transdisciplinary Approaches.” American Journal of Public Health 100, no. S1 (April 2010): S19–S24. doi:10.2105/AJPH.2009.189167.
Kronenfeld, Jennie Jacobs. Social Determinants, Health Disparities and Linkages to Health and Health Care. Emerald Group Publishing, 2013.
Lewis, Steven, Marcel Saulnier, and Marc Renaud. “Reconfiguring Health Policy: Simple Truths, Complex Solutions.” In Handbook of Social Studies in Health and Medicine. SAGE Publications Ltd, 2000.
Lynch, Julia, and Sarah E. Gollust. “Playing Fair: Fairness Beliefs and Health Policy Preferences in the United States.” Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law 35, no. 6 (December 1, 2010): 849–887. doi:10.1215/03616878-2010-032.
Navarro, V, and L Shi. “The Political Context of Social Inequalities and Health.” International Journal of Health Services: Planning, Administration, Evaluation 31, no. 1 (2001): 1–21.
Navarro, Vicente, Carles Muntaner, Carme Borrell, Joan Benach, Agueda Quiroga, Maica Rodríguez-Sanz, Núria Vergés, and M Isabel Pasarín. “Politics and Health Outcomes.” Lancet 368, no. 9540 (September 16, 2006): 1033–1037. doi:10.1016/S0140-6736(06)69341-0.
“Physician, Heal Thyself.” The Economist, February 1, 2014. http://www.economist.com/news/china/21595431-medicines-are-over-prescribed-and-overpriced-physician-heal-thyself.
Rohan, Angela Marie Kempf. Public Awareness and Perceptions of Health Disparities. ProQuest, 2008.
Wilkinson, Robert, and Pickett. “How Inequality Hollows Out the Soul.” New York Times, February 2, 2014. http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/02/02/how-inequality-hollows-out-the-soul/.

Post-Tsunami/Earthquake Waste in Japan-for Robin des Bois, Summer 2011

Les Déchets Post-Catastrophe 

(Post Catastrophic Waste)

DEAD: 13,232

MISSING: 14,544[1]

The March 11, 2011 earthquake and tsunami was catastrophic for Japan. Not only do the residents of Fukushima, Iwate and Miyagi prefectures have to contend with the fears of radioactive contamination, they have to bear the brunt of a massive clean-up effort.  Though related, finding a proper method to dispose of disaster waste is entirely different from cooling the reactors at the Fukushima nuclear reactors and presents its own host of problems.  This report aims to examine several aspects of the post-disaster waste left behind by the destruction.  First, we will start with the estimated extent and cost of the clean up, including a breakdown of each prefecture and the amount of damage in each respective area. In the second and third parts, we will analyze the government’s response to the waste problem and the obstacles they have encountered.  Fourthly, we will shortly discuss the spread of toxins and other contaminants and other related areas. (This section is inevitably short, since the collection of data is hampered both by a lack of access to affected areas and by a slow government bureaucracy.)

I. Measuring the Carnage

            There are rough estimates of the cost to infrastructure, but as more time passes, the scale and cost of the damage has and will become clearer.  According to the World Bank, the clean up will cost around $235 billion, making it the world’s most expensive disaster.[2]

A) Cost of the Damage and Clean-up

            In the early stages of the crises, perhaps occupied by more immediate concerns or perhaps hindered by communication obstacles, the government was prone to wide-ranging cost estimates.  The first measurements began appearing two weeks after the initial March 11 earthquake. The federal government on March 23 said the amount “could be more than double the cost of the Kobe earthquake,” ranging from ¥16 trillion ($198 billion) to ¥25 trillion ($310 billion.)  The World Bank (WB) estimated it at $122 to $235 billion.[3] A March 24 New York Times article stresses that the extent of infrastructure damage will remain unclear until further data is collected.[4]  Civilians from universities and think tanks were prohibited by transportation, as entry to the disaster areas was initially restricted only to emergency vehicles, or by the debris itself.[5] 

            By the following months, the figures became less shrouded in uncertainty but still differed among multiple sources. In April, the WB had solidified its estimate towards the higher extreme at $235 billion, with EU diplomats believing Japan would be the largest aid recipient in the year 2011.  On April 22^nd the government passed a $48 billion budget to deal with the crises, from which they earmarked 250 billion yen ($3.10 billion) just for clearing the debris itself.  However, a June 23^rd Wall Street Journal article cites that the total, actual cost of the removal is projected to be more than $8.4 billion.

B) Scale of the Disaster

            Again, the amount of damage done to Japan’s infrastructure and the length of the subsequent cleanup period differs from source to source but there is relative agreement among the key figures.  In the early stages, the amount of damage remaining on the ground and the damage to working infrastructure was at its worst. The following is a breakdown of the infrastructure status as of May 17^th-May 24^th, six to thirteen days after the initial earthquake.[6] [7]

Power

·     Two million households without power

·     Millions, including parts of the capital, had been subject to rolling blackouts and reduced train services

·     3% of the power service essentially taken out of service permanently

·     Oil and gas plants had been taken out of service for safety checks

Roads

·    Damage to roads is localized, only 4% of Japan’s total geographic area

·    Damage to air freight is minimal, only Sendai airport significantly damaged

Shipping

·    At least 6 seaports have seen major damage

·    The biggest port in the north-east Sendai has been destroyed and will not be operational for months

·    The closure of ports was estimated to be costing Japan $3.4 billion a day, in lost sea-borne trade each day

General Infrastructure

·    Gas & water distribution improved, but many towns remained with limited to no service

·    Engineers at University of Tokyo listed 17 bridges that had been washed away by the tsunami, flooding at one damaged dam, and dozens of landslides and deposits of debris that have closed roads. In one case, they reported tsunami damage along an 18-mile stretch of coastal roads south of Iwaki.

·    50 sewage plants damaged, 5 sewage plants destroyed

A month later, the Environment Ministry of Japan had solidified its estimates of the waste. For example, by April, it estimated the tsunami had generated about 16 million tons of waste in Miyagi Prefecture, 6 million tons in Iwate Prefecture and 2.9 million tons in Fukushima Prefecture. This includes at least 16 towns, 95,000 buildings, 23 railway stations and hundreds of kilometers of roads, railway tracks and sea walls.[8]  Japan’s National Police Agency says 18,000 houses collapsed and that about 140,000 others were partially damaged. This adds to a total of around 25 million tons, a figure the mainstream media has generally agreed upon.  But because vehicles and ships are not included in these figures, the total quantity is likely much higher.  But according to non-governmental sources, like Kazuyuki Akaishi of the Japan Research Institute, the volume can range from 80 million tons to 200 million tons.[9]  National Public Radio cites him as settling on “100 million tons.”[10] Without counting vehicles and ships, the amount of waste in the March disaster is 1.7 times that left by the 1995 quake.[11]   According to Shinichi Sakai, professor of environmental engineering at Kyoto University the waste is “about half of what the Japanese households produce in waste annually.”[12] Put in another way, the quantity of debris in the three prefectures is equivalent to more than a decade's worth of the region's normal solid-waste output.  It dwarfs the amount of debris—about 14.5 million tons—that had to be cleaned up after the Hanshin quake, which hit the southern port city of Kobe in 1995. The New York Times stated, “Wrecked houses and uprooted trees make up the majority of the waste.”[13]  The key word there is majority; there were and as of July 2011, there are large swaths of automobiles, ships, general infrastructure rubble, electronics, and

C) Cleanup Projections

Estimates of how long the clean up will take also differ from source to source.   On March 24, the New York Times quoted Tokyo saying reconstruction will take five years.  On May 11^th, the guardian stated the government estimates it will take three years to deal with the 25m tons of debris, which will have to be scrapped, burnt or recycled.  This figure seems underestimated, since according to a June 23^rd Wall Street Journal article, simply collecting and then sorting the debris will take two years.[14] Furthermore, clean up of the 1995 earthquake took years and the amount of waste in the 2011 quake is 1.7 times the former.[15]

II. Clean up: Process and Problems 

            This section covers the actual attempts to sort, separate and remove the rubble itself.  Progress was and is slow, due to a number of factors listed in the follow sub-sections. According to Environment Ministry estimates, as of May 17 the rubble that local governments have been able to pick up, transport and set aside at dump locations amounts to only a small portion of the total: 19 percent in Iwate, 14 percent in Miyagi and 11 percent in Fukushima. More than 200 sites have been set aside for dumping, but the ministry says many more are needed. By June 2nd, the New York Times cites the Environment Ministry saying less than 20 percent of the debris left by the disaster has been sorted and transported to collection sites.  By June 15, the figure had barely moved to over 5m tons – or 22% – having been removed. The slow pace of the clean up is not entirely the government’s fault.  The nuclear meltdown at Fukushima clearly occupied official priority and the majority of obstacles to the clean up are outside of human control.  For example, severed communication lines hampered discussion between local and federal government agencies and of course, the damaged infrastructure itself prevented access to damaged areas.[16] However, the government is clearly at fault in other areas, which we shall see later.

Lack of space

            The first and foremost problem is a clear lack of space to put the rubble.  Though not officially cited by the government, the media’s coverage of the rubble presents this as problem number one.  Even if rubble has been collected, sorted and is ready for transport, there is not enough space in collection areas, officials said.  "The volume is so great, it's difficult to know what to do with it all," said Tadashi Umiyama, the head of Ofunato's construction department (of Iwate Prefecture) and leader of its rubble-removal effort. "There's just not enough room."[17] In some collection centers, the debris has already reached heights of several stories. But even if the waste is piled five meters high-about the maximum possible to avoid spontaneous combustion-it could only store about 10 million tons of waste.  A symbolic example is the town of Morioka (Iwate), who said they need about 740 acres for storage, but so far they have found sites totaling only 320 acres.[18] The problem with Iwate and Miyagi prefectures is that neither have very flat topographies meaning, combined, they have a total of only 174 hectares (429.96 acres) to store debris temporarily.[19] There have been accounts of schoolyards and sport centers being used as temporary storage sites.[20] The Los Angeles Times reported baseball fields and stadiums also being used.[21]

Residents

            The clean-up process is being slowed to enable residents to salvage as many of their belongings as possible. Home-owners have a choice to deny permission for demolition. If they put a red flag outside their building, wrecking crews are allowed to tear the structures down and leave any possessions on the site. A yellow flag means the building should be left intact and only the surrounding roads cleared. Logically, this means the razing process cannot be done wholesale and must be done instead piece by piece. Furthermore, as morbid as it sounds, the clean up is slowed by searches for the dead.  For example, the Ofunato municipal government has left much debris largely untouched as it searches for the about 200 residents who are still missing. "It'll take a while to remove [the disaster waste] since we're doing it while we look for bodies," said Mamoru Sato, director of the city's urban planning department.[22]

Lack of resources

            The Waste Disposal Act dictates that “disaster-waste” is the responsibility of municipal governments. However, the extent of the disaster is so large these regional governments are finding themselves literally swamped by the debris.  Moreover, these municipal governments have in turn consigned the task to local companies of local governments.  These local authorities do not have the heavy-machinery necessary to move large amounts of waste and due to ordering problems, have been unable to obtain more.[23] In Kesennuma, Miyagi Prefecture, orders for debris removal are placed through an association for disposing of disaster-related waste that comprises about 90 local companies, mainly engineering firms, in the city.  The principle is to share work contracts among local companies. The association aims to finish in 200 days, meaning in December. The government of Kamaishi, Iwate Prefecture, has also left all elements of removing debris to a branch of the prefecture's association of construction companies, based on oral contracts. Work periods and remuneration were not specified.  The government of Ishinomaki, Miyagi Prefecture, signed contracts with individual construction companies, but a branch in the city of the prefectural association assigns work areas to each company.[24] Again, morbidly, municipal and local governments are facing human resource shortages, as many civil servants perished in the earthquake/tsunami or have gone to look for their families.  The majority of municipal governments have asked for outside help and believe the clean up task can only be completed in a reasonable time if the federal governments aids the process.  By April, the government said it would pay for the entire cleanup operation but significant funds have yet to be distributed as of July 2011. 

Legal Barriers

            The above-mentioned Waste Disposal Act stipulates that municipal governments are mandated to clean up post-disaster waste. It reads, “In this Law, ‘waste’ refers to refuse, bulky refuse, ashes, sludge, excreta, waste oil, waste acid and alkali, carcasses and other filthy and unnecessary matter, which are in solid or liquid state (excluding radioactive waste and waste polluted by radioactivity).”   But, the Nuclear Reactor Regulation Law defines radiation-contaminated waste as water or items tainted during incidents inside a nuclear power plant facility; it does not cover radioactive substances dispersed outside a nuclear facility due to an accident.  This legal ambiguity has meant slow progress in the disaster-affected areas, namely Fukushima. Moreover, the Waste Disposal Act explicitly excludes “industrial waste,” which includes “all the waste left as a result of business activity.”[25]  In theory, this means waste contaminated by damaged production or chemical plants will fall under the jurisdiction of the federal government.  But due to the near impossible task of distinguishing contaminated waste from “safe” waste, this section of the law has not been put into practice. The federal government will eventually stipulate standards to dispose of radioactive-contaminated waste (see section III), but it is in this domain where Tokyo could have acted more decisively. 

Contamination

            The most significant obstacle to proper debris removal is contamination, the least of which is from radioactivity.  A simple listing of the possible toxins would be insufficient to discuss how the problem is intricately tied in with efforts to remove the rubble.  It is necessary to first review attempted solutions on the part of the government. 

III.  Attempted Solutions and Subsequent Problems

            It is a horrid way to teach, but the 1995 Kobe gave Japan the experience to respond to a similar disaster.  In some ways, the central government and its institutions seemed to have learned some lessons. For example, Tokyo’s immediate response was much quicker than it was over a decade ago.[26] However, it is clear that the Kobe earthquake and the “Great East Earthquake” of 2011 differ in many respects, most notably in the size of the disaster, the subsequent size of the clean-up, and thus the proportional size of contamination.  The following section will address the attempted solutions taken on part by the government to solve the debris problem.  In some respects, neither Tokyo nor municipal or local governments have succeeded in solving every problem listed in the above section.  However, some progress has been made in certain areas, as we shall see.

Recycling

Of the assorted types of debris leftover from the disaster, the government aims to recycle as much as possible.  In mid-May, the Environment Ministry published a guideline on the subject of.  Of course, the first step in doing so is to sort and separate the rubble.  The most basic divisions are among concrete, wood and steel; though within this categorization there are sure to be further divisions. Furukawa Tatsuhiro, a bridge engineer who had been assigned to a demolition operation said, "Just clearing the debris will take a year or two, then sorting everything will need several more years."  Metal, from wrecked automobiles, house parts or other refuse will be sold for scrap metal. At Kamaishi, wrecked vehicles are moved to the police car park, which has become a graveyard for more than 600 Nissans, Toyotas and Hondas. Owners can claim their cars or condemn them as scrap.  Wood will be burned to be used as biomass fuel at biopower plants (see next section.)  Other unusable debris will be collected and transported to dump sites.  To assist in recycling, the Forestry Agency will subsidize 50 percent of the cost of crushing machines that turn waste lumber and wood into chips, the only usable form of wood the incinerators will accept.  In Sendai, the capital of the hardest hit Miyagi, the agency set a goal of putting 10 percent to 20 percent of the waste wood into productive use. The recycling targets are low because most local governments in the devastated areas do not have the manpower or resources to carry out the full formula of collecting, sorting and recycling set out in guidelines drafted by the Environment Ministry after the disaster.  Sendai estimates that the heap of wood waste will add up to 230,000 to 250,000 tons. Some cities are depending on the electricity created by biomass plants, to make up for the loss of power from the Fukushima Dai-ichi plant.

Incineration

            The ash produced by the incineration will be used in the process of reconstruction, namely making more concrete.  The Ofunato kiln in Iwate Prefecture is a prime example.  In its first day of operation, it processed about 10 tons of rubble.  Engineers say it will eventually be able to handle up to 300 tons per day.  However, in an ironic twist, the earthquake and tsunami damaged the plant, hindering its ability to run at full efficiency.  Other kilns in Iwate, Miyagi and Fukushima have had similar problems.  And incineration is not a silver bullet.  Even if the government can persuade every waste-disposal plant in the Iwate prefecture to devote 20% of its capacity to rubble, it will take four years to get rid of it all.[27]  Furthermore, there is a risk of contamination.  Much of the wood contains high quantities of salt, leftover from the tsunami.  Not only will burning salty wood damage incinerators, it will produce dangerous carcinogens, like dioxins and furans.[28] The National Institute for Environmental Studies in Ibaraki Prefecture said that exposing such wood debris to the elements, like rain, could wash out some of the saline content.  This recommendation was officially endorsed by the government’s Guidelines for Disaster Waste Management. Firstly, there will be little amounts of rain during the summer months of 2011, when significant clean-up efforts have already been started.  Secondly, it is not clear that the municipal/local authorities have the patience or manpower to follow said guidelines.  

Approval to incinerate contaminated rubble

            Faced with legal ambiguities, general confusion about waste management, lack of space, and hence growing mountains of flammable trash, the central government was finally forced to find a temporary solution that would relieve at least some of the pressure from the clean-up process.  On June 19^th, the Environment Ministry approved the incineration and burial of radioactive waste, providing it falls under a certain threshold.   Though this policy mainly concerns Fukushima, it very well applies to Iwate and Miyagi prefectures since both have been discovered to contain contaminated waste.[29]  In essence, the ministry has allowed local governments to bury burned rubble containing less than 8,000 becquerels of radioactive cesium per kilogram of rubble at waterproof final disposal sites for ordinary waste. However, the ministry will ban such disposal sites from being converted to residential areas in the future.[30]  Officials said they settled on 8,000 becquerels because that amount is deemed safe to handle it directly.  Ash and other rubble that contains above the 8,000 level will be placed in special drums that can block radiation.  What the government will do with those drums has yet to be determined.  Authorities have been asked to store ash containing more than 100,000 becquerels in facilities shielded by concrete walls.  Furthermore, the June 19^th policy allows sludge, concrete fragments and other non-burnable waste to be placed in final disposal sites for ordinary waste.  This caveat is misleading, as it appears to imply that these other types of refuse are considered as safe as normal trash.  However, they also contain radioactivity.  For example, toxic sludge was first found in a sewage treatment facility in Fukushima on May 1^st and has since been found in other prefectures as well.  Lastly, the June 19^th guideline did not cover the debris and waste within the evacuation zone around the Fukushima nuclear plant, which has remained untouched.

IV. Toxins and Contamination

            So far, we have discussed two possible types of contamination, radioactivity from the Fukushima plant and the possibility of carcinogens from the burning of salted wood. However there are other toxins that result from the infrastructure damage brought on by both the earthquake and tsunami.

Asbestos

            The most immediate concern is asbestos.  First off, the sheer amount of possible asbestos in the damaged buildings will be much higher than in other developed countries.  Japan had banned spry-on asbestos in 1975, but a broader law preventing asbestos use outright was not passed until 2006.[31] Japan's health ministry has distributed 90,000 dust prevention masks although many workers do not wear them because they restrict breathing. It will soon distribute 600 high-efficiency filter masks with electric fans to make breathing easier.

Activists have found the cancer-causing, fibrous material in the air and debris collected from the devastated northeastern coast.  Asbestos was not an immediate concern after the tsunami, since infrastruture remained wet. But now that the majority of rubble has dried and clean up efforts will stir up laten debris, asbestos will be a growing concern. 

Other Toxins

            According to Professor Atsushi Iizuka and other researchers at Kobe University, 2.2 times the national standards of arsenic, fluorine and boron compounds were detected along the coastal region of Miyagi Prefecture.[32]  These came from facilities containing said material, particularly petrochemical, chemical and industrial plants.  Specifically, the researchers collected soil samples from ten locations in Miyagi and measured them against the safety standards stipulated in the Soil Contamination Countermeasures Law.  Lead and lead compounds were also found but their levels were well below national standards.  There have been calls to measure the levels of toxins in other areas, before all the contaminants dry and turn in powder, creating a inhalation problem with the citizens.

---

[1] Matthew Bloch and al., “Map of the Damage from the Japanese Earthquake,” Interactive (Northern Japan: New York Times, 2011).

[2] “After the tsunami: Japan’s clear-up likely to take three years | World news | The Guardian”, May 11, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/may/11/japanese-tsunami-survivors-search-for-mementos.

[3] Takashi Nakamichi and Tatsuo Ito, “Tokyo Estimates Disaster Costs of Almost $200 Billion,” wsj.com, March 24, 2011, sec. Asian Business News, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704050204576217852022676740.html.

[4] Henry Fountain, “Extent of Infrastructure Damage in Japan Is Still Unclear,” The New York Times, March 24, 2011, sec. World / Asia Pacific, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/25/world/asia/25infrastructure.html?_r=1&scp=25&sq=japan+debris&st=nyt.

[5] Ibid. The National Science Foundation, which finances field research after disasters and supported an engineering team that went to New Zealand after the recent earthquake there, said it was accepting proposals for Japan. The review process takes several weeks.

[6] “Crisis damage to cut Japan growth,” BBC, March 17, 2011, sec. Business, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-12756379.

[7] Henry Fountain, “Extent of Infrastructure Damage in Japan Is Still Unclear,” The New York Times, March 24, 2011, sec. World / Asia Pacific, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/25/world/asia/25infrastructure.html?_r=1&scp=25&sq=japan+debris&st=nyt.

[8] “After the tsunami: Japan’s clear-up likely to take three years | World news | The Guardian”, May 11, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/may/11/japanese-tsunami-survivors-search-for-mementos.

[9] Julie Makinen, “After Japan disaster, disposing of waste creates dilemmas,” Los Angeles Times, May 3, 2011, http://www.latimes.com/news/science/la-fg-japan-trash-20110403,0,5626871.story?track=rss&utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+latimes%2Fnews%2Fscience+%28L.A.+Times+-+Science%29.

[10] Yuki Noguchi, “One Big Obstacle to Japan’s Recovery? Trash,” National Public Radio, April 29, 2011, http://www.npr.org/2011/04/29/135770675/one-big-obstacle-to-japans-recovery-trash.

[11] “March 11 quake left behind 25m tons of waste,” Asia One News, April 17, 2011.

[12] Miki Tanikawa, “Finding Use for 25 Million Tons of Rubble,” The New York Times, June 2, 2011, sec. Business Day / Global Business, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/03/business/global/03iht-RBOG-JAPAN-RUBBLE03.html.

[13] Miki Tanikawa, “Finding Use for 25 Million Tons of Rubble,” The New York Times, June 2, 2011, sec. Business Day / Global Business, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/03/business/global/03iht-RBOG-JAPAN-RUBBLE03.html.

[14] Gordon Fairclough, “Debris Blocks Japan Recovery Aims,” wsj.com, June 23, 2011, sec. Japan News, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303499204576390191637374796.html.

[15] “March 11 quake left behind 25m tons of waste,” Asia One News, April 17, 2011.

[16] “Casting about for a future: The Japanese economy is recovering faster than expected from disaster. Can broader reform come quickly too?,” The Economist, May 19, 2011, http://www.economist.com/node/18713566.

[17] Gordon Fairclough, “Debris Blocks Japan Recovery Aims,” wsj.com, June 23, 2011, sec. Japan News, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303499204576390191637374796.html.

[18] Ibid.

[19] “March 11 quake left behind 25m tons of waste,” Asia One News, April 17, 2011.

[20] “Mountains of rubble remain a headache in Fukushima,” Asahi News, June 25, 2011, http://www.asahi.com/english/TKY201106240210.html.

[21] Julie Makinen, “After Japan disaster, disposing of waste creates dilemmas,” Los Angeles Times, May 3, 2011, http://www.latimes.com/news/science/la-fg-japan-trash-20110403,0,5626871.story?track=rss&utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+latimes%2Fnews%2Fscience+%28L.A.+Times+-+Science%29.

[22] “March 11 quake left behind 25m tons of waste,” Asia One News, April 17, 2011.

[23] “Japan: Focus on local firms slows debris removal,” Asia One News, May 16, 2011, http://www.asiaone.com/News/Latest+News/Asia/Story/A1Story20110516-279054.html.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Japanese Government, Waste Management and Public Cleansing Law, Law No. 137 of 1970, 1970.

[26] “Stoicism amid the debris,” The Economist, March 13, 2011, http://www.economist.com/blogs/banyan/2011/03/after_earthquake. (Tokyo mobilized 100,000 troops to begin the search-and-rescue effort)

[27] Gordon Fairclough, “Debris Blocks Japan Recovery Aims,” wsj.com, June 23, 2011, sec. Japan News, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303499204576390191637374796.html.

[28] “Wood Burning and Your Health.” n. pag. Print.

[29] “Radioactive Debris Dilemma Unresolved, Growing Worse.” Japan Times Online 1 July 2011. Web. 7 July 2011.

[30] “Environment Ministry to Approve Incineration of Rubble Contaminated with Radiation.” Mainichi Daily News 20 June 2011. Web. 27 June 2011.

[31] Tomoko Hosaka, “Asbestos, Japan tsunami’s other hidden danger,” Associated Press, April 27, 2011, http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20110427/ap_on_re_as/as_japan_earthquake_asbestos;_ylt=AjfPR2Si4CF1_wKO0J7rNwunxQ8F;_ylu=X3oDMTMzOHJmNTgxBGFzc2V0A2FwLzIwMTEwNDI3L2FzX2phcGFuX2VhcnRocXVha2VfYXNiZXN0b3MEcG9zAzIwBHNlYwN5bl9wYWdpbmF0ZV9zdW1tYXJ5X2xpc3QEc2xrA2FzYmVzdG9zamFwYQ--.

[32] “Double the standard of toxic materials detected along coast of Miyagi Prefecture,” Mainichi Daily News, June 25, 2011, online edition edition, http://mdn.mainichi.jp/mdnnews/news/20110602p2a00m0na016000c.html.

#1

Why should you read my blog? Because it's not about me. It's about you and everyone else. Yes, you could say that essentially, the blog is about me: it espouses my ideas and opinions. But the subject of my blog is not I.
Why should you read my blog? Because I make and enter a (multiplicity of) discourse that each and everyone of you might find relevant.
Why should you read my blog? Because in argument and discourse one's argument is made clearer, the truth is slowly uncovered and humanity benefits.
Why should you read my blog? Because it is a slow fight against ignorance, against common-sense ideals, against the crowd mentality and against immorality.

Do I believe the posts here will achieve all that I claim? No.
Many will deride this blog as useless, stupid and ostentatious.
Many will deride me as useless, stupid and ostentatious.
That is fine. You, reader, will know where they stand in relation to the ideas put forth.
Many will consider my person (any aspect of it) as warrant for my observations' being fallacious. I ask you not to value me, but my ideas. These are independent of me.
Editing will take place only to elucidate and clarify.
Do I believe I am some kind of arbiter of truth? No.
The Truth is there for all to attain; I am your stepping stool. Don't bother wiping your shoes.
Those smarter, stronger and abler than I should attempt to help, not me, but Truth.

What is the ultimate goal of such posting?
1) To facilitate discourse on the subject of the post (discourse either here in the form of comments, discourse on the street in the form of heated argument or discourse in the mind in the form of wrestling logic)-->
2) By dialectic, the truth will out.
3) There is nothing that is an end in itself, this post included and Truth included. "Only Man is an end in himself." -Ayn Rand